

## THE FORUM

---

# FORUM: POWER AND RULES IN THE PROFESSION OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

BRETT ASHLEY LEEDS

*Rice University*

J. ANN TICKNER

*American University*

COLIN WIGHT

*University of Sydney*

AND

JESSICA DE ALBA-ULLOA

*Universidad Anáhuac México*

Scholars of international studies frequently examine the interaction of power and rules in their subject of study. Our profession also has significant power dynamics and rules that are mutually constitutive. In this forum, four scholars consider aspects of the current formal and informal rules of the profession of international studies that influence our field.

**Keywords:** diversity, Global South, international studies profession, power, underrepresented groups

---

## Diversity of Scholars and Diversity of Scholarship

BRETT ASHLEY LEEDS

*Rice University*

As scholars of international studies, our job is to bring understanding, based on various modes of scholarship, to aspects of our world and the interactions of those within it. Our efforts at achieving understanding are individual, but they are also communal; we learn as a community of scholars, building on and challenging the work of those who came before, cooperating with and debating our contemporaries,

Leeds, Brett Ashley et al. (2019) FORUM: POWER AND RULES IN THE PROFESSION OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES.

*International Studies Review*, doi: 10.1093/isr/viz016

© The Author(s) (2019). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.

All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [journals.permissions@oup.com](mailto:journals.permissions@oup.com)

and training those who will come next. Each of us plays an individual role in a larger whole that produces a broad body of knowledge, which, in turn, influences policies and significant aspects of human life. We need a scholarly community best poised to bring our training to bear on the pressing problems facing humans across the globe.

How do we as a community determine what subjects we focus on, what questions we ask, and what new ideas we nurture? This seems important, since what is studied and how broadly we think about the issues we study influences what we learn and in turn who benefits most from our research. It is my contention that individual scholars make choices about what to study and how to study it both based on the incentives produced by our professional rules, norms, and environs and based on our own lived experiences. The challenge we face as a discipline is that the great majority of people recognized as scholars of international studies come from a narrow range of life experiences; they are overwhelmingly white, male descendants of middle- or upper-class families in Western / Global North countries. The result is a dominance of research topics and approaches that appeal to and speak to those backgrounds. Increasing the diversity of scholars is likely to increase the diversity of scholarship, and this will improve our understanding of the world and help us accomplish our profession's goals.

Diversifying scholars, however, will be challenging. In this essay, I first make the case that lived experiences influence research, even for those who adopt positivist approaches. I then discuss the challenges of increasing diversity in the profession, most of which are related to structural societal issues. A key problem is barriers to access that many face in entering the research community. Finally, I discuss some of the actions that we need to take individually, at our universities and institutions of employment, and in our professional associations to move forward productively.

Given the argument of this essay, I would be remiss if I did not explicitly recognize my own biases. I am a white, female, American scholar. I grew up in an upper middle-class family, and both my parents earned postgraduate degrees. I am a tenured faculty member at an elite private university. My research is considered mainstream and employs a positivist approach using primarily quantitative evidence. I have never lived or worked outside the United States. I am highly privileged and perhaps misinformed about the international studies profession outside my immediate circle. My gender, however, has caused me to be more conscious of formal and informal power structures than I might otherwise be. As a child in the 1970s and 1980s, a graduate student in the 1990s, and a professor for the last twenty years, I have seen enormous change in the role of women in society and in our profession. This transformation may be instructive for how other kinds of diversity in scholars will influence our profession.

Data collected by the American Political Science Association (APSA) show that women made up 10 percent of the full-time faculty in political science in 1978, 21 percent in 1998, and 35 percent today (Sarkees and McGlen 1999).<sup>1</sup> Breuning, Bredehoft, and Walton (2005) report that at the time they were writing, 32 percent of International Studies Association (ISA) members were female, whereas today 43 percent are female.<sup>2</sup> Longitudinal examination of the programs for the Peace Science Society Annual Meeting shows that over approximately a twenty-year period, the annual meeting went from having 15 percent of the papers including at least one female author to 35 percent (Mitchell 2017).

There are big differences, however, in the proportion of women studying different topics. According to the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP)

<sup>1</sup>Data on the gender of APSA members is available at APSA Membership, accessed August 5, 2018, <https://www.apsanet.org/RESOURCES/Data-on-the-Profession/Dashboard/Membership>.

<sup>2</sup>Data on the gender of ISA members is available at ISA, "Gender Distribution of ISA Membership," accessed August 5, 2018, <http://www.isanet.org/ISA/About-ISA/Data/Gender>.

survey conducted in the United States in 2014, the percentage of male scholars saying that their main area of research was United States foreign policy was three times the percentage of female scholars saying the same (Maliniak et al. 2014). Yet, the percentage of female scholars saying that their main area of research was human security was more than three times the percentage of men. The percentage of men studying IR theory was nearly twice as high as that of women, and the percentage of women studying human rights was nearly twice as high as that of men.<sup>3</sup> The ISA sections with the highest proportions of female members are feminist theory, human rights, global health, and international education. The ISA sections with the lowest proportion of female members are Intelligence Studies, English School, Historical International Relations, and Scientific Study of International Processes. Mitchell (2017, 108) compares topics presented at the Peace Science Society conference to those presented at the female-only Journeys in World Politics conference and finds “there is a much greater emphasis on human rights, post-war peace, peaceful institutions, foreign aid, policy questions, and civil society groups by women who present at Journeys than by scholars in Peace Science more generally.” Colgan (2017) finds that women are more likely to teach courses in the category of international organization and law than are men, and Maliniak, Powers, and Walter (2013, 6) report “men are more likely to write articles on security, United States foreign policy, and methods. Women are more likely to write articles on human rights, comparative foreign policy, health, international law, and the environment.” Studies also report differences in the theoretical, epistemological, and methodological approaches taken by men and women (e.g., Breuning et al. 2005; Hancock, Baum, and Breuning 2013; Maliniak et al. 2013).

Why is it that women have focused their attention on different research areas than men? It could be that scholars are directed toward areas that are perceived as appropriate for people like them. It may be that women are discouraged (explicitly or implicitly) from studying topics like war and power politics. It may also be that having occupied a nondominant societal position throughout their lives causes greater awareness of the impact of informal norms, the relationships between power and rules, and the differential rights of citizens within states. People who have experienced the world differently because of social position may have different instincts about factors explaining interactions and outcomes and may find different areas of study appealing and important. Note that it need not be the case that anyone consciously makes the choice to study factors that help them understand their own life experiences. Certainly, no one should feel they must choose to study ethnic politics or feminist theory or development simply because of their demographic characteristics. But to the extent that different lived experiences influence our interests and our instincts about human behavior, diversifying scholars will diversify scholarship.

There is now a larger community working together on many of these newer research foci, building on one another’s work and training students. Yet, even as raw numbers of women in the profession increase, women hold a minority of gatekeeping roles. There is a leaky pipeline, meaning there are fewer senior women to take on journal editorships, committee chairpersonships, and leadership roles (Hesli, Lee, and Mitchell 2012; Hancock et al. 2013). Of the ten journals that respondents to the TRIP survey in 2014 claimed were most influential in international relations, only three (#5 *World Politics*, #9 *Millennium*, and #10 *Review of International Studies*) have female lead editors in 2018 (Maliniak et al. 2014).<sup>4</sup> On one hand, the growth of women in the field of international studies has likely diversified research and may be a model for how important diversity is for our field. On the other hand,

<sup>3</sup>TRIP survey data are available at “TRIP Faculty Survey in United States,” accessed August 5, 2018, <https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/chartdata/1243/85>.

<sup>4</sup>Data were obtained from Teaching, Research, and International Policy, “TRIP Faculty Survey All Countries Combined,” accessed November 24, 2018, <https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/chartdata/5068/86>, as well as from the websites of the top ten journals listed.

evidence suggests that it is harder for this work to have influence. Work by women is cited less and is less likely to appear on syllabi (e.g., Maliniak et al. 2013; Colgan 2017). These biases exist AFTER controlling for the fact that women are more likely to work in research areas and use research methods that are less well cited and less often included on syllabi. I contend that it is no coincidence that underrepresented groups work in underrepresented areas. By controlling for these things, we are understating the problem.

What about other underrepresented groups? Within the United States, we know that people of color make up a small proportion of the political science profession. As of December 2017, 3.59 percent of the members of the American Political Science Association identify as “Black, Afro-Caribbean, or African-American” and 4.76 percent as “Latino or Hispanic American.” These figures drop to 2.21 percent and 3.25 percent, respectively, when we examine APSA members whose primary sub-field is International Politics.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, the Race, Ethnicity, and Politics section of APSA is 23 percent African-American and 16 percent Latino. While the overall numbers are very small, we can see from the 2014 TRIP survey in the United States that those African-Americans and Latinos who study international relations also choose different topics of study than their white counterparts (Maliniak et al. 2014). African American and Latino scholars make up a larger portion of the scholars studying human rights than they do of scholars studying international security, international political economy, or United States foreign policy.<sup>6</sup>

Within ISA, we know that the number of members from the Global South is quite small. The 2018 Global South Task Force Report identifies 11 percent of ISA members as working in the Global South (Behera and Hinds 2018).<sup>7</sup> The same report states that “In terms of research foci, the thrust areas of Global North and Global South often do not match. For instance, multilateralism and international organizations are not a priority area in the American IR whereas Global South focuses on it a lot. Similarly, the goal of equity and justice in the global order are not the mainstay of Western academia but a central concern of the Global South” (Behera and Hinds 2018, 38).

Even setting aside the very real issues of bias, there are challenges for scholars from underrepresented groups to enter the profession of international studies. Most scholars of international studies hold a PhD, a degree that takes many years of postgraduate training. Being able to make the human capital investment of schooling is a luxury available only to those who can afford to have a long shadow of the future. Even though many PhD programs do not require students to pay tuition and provide a modest fellowship in return for limited work during the training period, the fellowship only covers subsistence. Potential students with financial obligations to their families, substantial debt, or a need to contribute immediately to their communities cannot afford the opportunity costs of investing in a PhD. And, of course, getting to the stage of applying for a PhD requires a prior investment in college and earlier education. One needs adequate pretraining—including for many students advanced training in a second language—to pursue doctoral work.

Even for those members of underrepresented groups who gain the background necessary, successfully compete for spaces in PhD programs, and complete their degrees, the ability to contribute to the canon of research in international studies may be challenging. As Tickner and De Alba-Ulloa both note in their contributions to this forum, existing scholarly approaches and norms may make it difficult for

<sup>5</sup> Data were obtained from the American Political Science Association, accessed August 5, 2018, <https://www.apsanet.org/RESOURCES/Data-on-the-Profession/Dashboard/Membership>.

<sup>6</sup> Data were obtained from Teaching, Research, and International Policy, “TRIP Faculty Survey in United States,” accessed November 24, 2018, <https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/chartdata/1304/118>.

<sup>7</sup> The report is available here: “ISA Task Force on the Global South: 2018 Annual Report,” accessed August 5, 2018, [https://www.isanet.org/Portals/0/Documents/GlobalSouth/2018\\_GlobalSouthTaskForce.pdf](https://www.isanet.org/Portals/0/Documents/GlobalSouth/2018_GlobalSouthTaskForce.pdf).

scholars to pursue different approaches and questions. Scholars from underrepresented groups may also feel they have greater obligations to community involvement, teaching, and mentoring. They may choose to work at institutions that are poorly resourced (in the Global South, for example), where they can have a great influence on the future distribution of scholars like them. Influencing the scholarly community, especially with breakthrough ideas, is easier with the resources to travel and promote one's work.

Recognizing the value of diversity in scholars is the first step, but how do we then make progress toward a broader representation of the world's population in our profession? The structural problems of inequality and bias are tremendous societal barriers to progress, and we have to accept and recognize that there is no simple fix. Much of the solution lies in broader changes in our world—changes that we as world citizens do have responsibility for but that are beyond the scope of this essay. I will instead focus on issues that we as members of the international studies profession have more direct control over.

First, it is appropriate for our professional associations to have a mission of redistribution. Those of us who are fortunate enough to be in positions of privilege within this field of study should be willing to pay higher dues with the expectation that money collected from those dues will be used to sponsor the professional activities of graduate students and our colleagues working in low-resource environments. ISA, for example, sponsors travel grants, research workshop grants, and mentoring programs. The dues structure at ISA recently became more progressive; this is a change in rules for access to ISA. My colleagues who are as fortunate as I am are seeing their dues increase. What they get for that, in part, is the opportunity to be part of a diverse and vibrant organization with significant intellectual exchange across all kinds of boundaries. I ask that when you think about the value of association memberships, you think not only about what you gain personally but what the profession gains from your contribution. These rules changes need to be accepted by members to be able to make a difference. If high-income members exit the association, the rules change will not accomplish its goals. Thus, rules operate best when accompanied by norms supporting these rules.

Second, at our universities, many of us are gatekeepers in our roles as members of graduate admissions committees and hiring committees. The role of implicit bias in hiring and admission decisions has gotten increased attention lately. Implicit bias is the unconscious association of particular qualities with members of particular social groups. For example, one might subconsciously associate women with family and men with careers. The blog post by [Hazel Morrow Jones and Janet Box-Steffensmeier \(2014\)](#) in *The Political Methodologist* is quite useful in understanding the role of implicit bias in academic hiring. There are strategies we can employ to reduce our own implicit bias, like slowing down our decision-making and developing explicit criteria to evaluate applicants systematically. Evidence suggests that these methods can make a difference (e.g., [Martell 1991](#); [Uhlmann and Cohen 2005](#); [Owens et al. 2018](#)), and universities can create formal rules about the conduct of searches.<sup>8</sup> Yet, while there is evidence that implicit bias training can reduce bias and provide participants with strategies for combatting their own biases, there is also evidence that implicit bias training does not eliminate bias entirely. Implicit bias training does not address explicit bias, and it sometimes creates backlash ([Atewoglugun, Cormish, and Tresh 2018](#)).

Removing implicit bias also cannot address prior differences in preparation. I frequently hear from colleagues involved in graduate admissions across fields that the best signal that a student will be a successful graduate student is to have research experience with a successful scholar as an undergraduate. Of course, this opportunity

<sup>8</sup> My own university requires search committees to include at least five members with diverse backgrounds and for all search committee members to undergo a training session at least once every three years.

is primarily available to those who did their undergraduate work at major research universities and had the knowledge and efficacy to build relationships with well-known researchers early. The opportunity is also more accessible to students who can afford to spend their time on unpaid internships. The informal criterion of prior research experience may create more barriers to admission to graduate school (and especially the graduate programs with the most competitive admissions processes) than any other. And where a candidate went to graduate school is extremely influential in hiring decisions. A recent analysis of hiring in sociology departments finds that highly ranked departments tend to hire from other highly ranked departments and that “the secular trend is that the more highly ranked the program, the narrower the schools from which they hire, and the higher the average ranking of the programs from which their professors earned their PhDs” (Emerson 2018). Universities must create incentives for admissions committees and hiring committees to consider candidates with less conventional backgrounds and less conventional research profiles.

Third, we each have individual responsibilities in our everyday roles. Those of us who teach must seek out diverse work to assign to show our students a broad range of possibilities. Those of us who mentor and advise undergraduate students should reflect on what we are doing to encourage students from diverse backgrounds to pursue a role in our profession. When we mentor graduate students, we should think about how we encourage our students to pursue new questions and new approaches effectively within the constraints of our current structures. We should think about how we help them engage what they are passionate about, and what led them to the profession in the first place, rather than filling a gap in the existing literature. We should think about how we support students who wish to contribute to the profession in different ways—some primarily through research, some through teaching and mentoring, some through policy work or activism—while not making assumptions about what are the appropriate future roles for our students. When we engage in peer review, we should think carefully and critically before declaring work to be “not of interest to a general audience” or “addressing a question outside the core mission of our field.” And in our research, we must work to consider how our work engages with a broad range of scholarship, including work that uses very different starting assumptions and approaches. We each hold individual power in changing the field through these efforts.

While no scholar should ever feel a responsibility to choose research topics because of personal background, lived experiences do color how we see the world. What topics receive research attention and the approaches taken to answering these questions is likely to be influenced by the diversity of scholars in our profession. This, in turn, will influence who our research benefits and how well we accomplish our profession’s goal—a deeper understanding of our world.

## The Disciplining of International Studies

J. ANN TICKNER

*American University*

Who holds the power and makes the rules that determine the character of the international studies profession? In this short discussion piece, I offer some answers to the following three questions that are intended to probe this issue. First, who is recognized as a member of the profession; second, how does this affect what we do and how we study international relations; and third, what changes might produce different outcomes? In the conclusion, I will offer some suggestions for my preferred outcomes.

While I recognize that these questions would call for quite different answers, depending on one's location, and while I have worked at institutions outside the United States, I will limit these comments to international studies within the United States, the environment with which I am most familiar.

When speaking of recognition as a member of international studies' academic profession, there are very few formal rules other than having an advanced degree in some field that deals with the international. However, most of the rules of recognition are informal and depend largely on an often-hidden power structure that has enormous influence over who succeeds and who fails. Ours is a largely white profession and majority male, although this has been changing over the last thirty years, more so with respect to women than persons of color.

It is my belief that membership in the profession should include historians, sociologists, economists, political scientists, anthropologists, geographers, and lawyers. Given our current climate crisis, those trained in environmental studies should also qualify. And while solutions to the multidimensional challenges of our contemporary world seem to demand multidisciplinary research, and universities stress the importance of global studies and interdisciplinary approaches to research and teaching, at American academic institutions international studies is usually a subfield of political science, known as IR.<sup>9</sup>

Introduced into universities at the end of the nineteenth century, disciplines continue to delineate the structure of American higher education (Mittelman 2018, 101). In spite of calls for interdisciplinary research, disciplinary rules and cultures are a powerful force that dominates the academy. Tenure and promotion generally depend on accreditation within a defined discipline. In American IR, being a political scientist trained in mainstream theory and positivist methodologies is the most likely road to success. And in a tight job market, academic placement depends a lot on where you get your degree. This *disciplining* of international studies seems like a particular irony in light of today's many global crises that cry out for interdisciplinary and multifaceted solutions.<sup>10</sup>

So how does this *disciplining* affect what we study and how we study it? What we study, teach, and research in American IR is largely governed by events in *the real world*, where *the real world* is defined as what is of importance to the national interest, particularly the security interests, of the United States. The founding of the discipline in the early twentieth century is generally associated with the tragedy of World War I and scholars' efforts to understand the causes of war to try to prevent their happening again (Schmidt 1998). Indeed, the study of war and security has been a defining feature of international studies. What is less well known is that early international studies scholars were also preoccupied with the issue of race, specifically how to maintain control over nonwhite populations in the colonial world (Vitalis 2015). After World War II, imperialism largely dropped out of American IR. During the Cold War, topics accorded the greatest prestige and recognition had to do with strategic and security studies, as seen from the vantage point of the great powers (Morgenthau 1973). After the 1971 financial crisis, there was a shift to a concern with international political economy (Gilpin 1987; Keohane and Nye 1989) and after the Cold War, a turn to globalization (Mittelman 1997). Since 9/11, the focus has returned to national security studies, with a particular emphasis on terrorist studies (Sandler 2012).<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> I will use the term *IR* when I refer to international studies as a subdiscipline of political science.

<sup>10</sup> Of course, there are exceptions to this model. My own institution, American University has a large interdisciplinary international studies school, the School of International Service, as do several other universities in Washington DC and elsewhere.

<sup>11</sup> Again, I recognize I am making generalizations. Certainly, there is now more attention to problems of the Global South and there are many more texts on race, gender and postcolonial studies (see for examples, Ling 2002; Tickner 2014; Vitalis 2015). It is questionable, however, how often these texts appear on reading lists at major American universities.

Since, as I have said, American international studies are largely confined to a sub-discipline of political science, this has had a big effect on *how* we study IR, an outcome I believe is more problematic than *what* we study. In the United States, those who use rational choice models and positivist methodologies more generally are likely to be the most successful in the job market as well as in tenure and promotion at major universities. As someone who does feminist theory and uses postpositivist methodologies, I have had a hard time placing my PhD students in American universities. Many of them are working overseas, or in poorly paid adjunct teaching positions, or are employed outside the academy. And tenure and promotion depend very much on publishing with university presses and in what are considered the *right* journals, such as the *American Political Science Review*, *International Organization*, and *International Studies Quarterly*. Interestingly, most of the feminist scholarship that does get published in these journals (*ISQ* excepted) uses mainstream quantitative methodologies (Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Hudson et al. 2008/2009). And the pressure from university administrators for increasing the rankings of their institutions feeds into the notion that the quantity of publications is at least as important as quality. So, I would argue that *how* you conduct your research is probably the more likely road to success than *what* you study.

While many important questions about international issues can be explained or understood using positivist methodologies, I would argue that there are certain issues that cannot be studied and certain questions that cannot be asked using these methodologies. For example, if we are to answer questions about why women and minorities are disproportionately located at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale in all societies, we need to understand the social construction of race, class, and gender, a structural inequality that rewards certain groups over others (Tickner 2005).

So what changes could be made that would make international studies truly international? I offer some suggestions that might lead to my preferred outcome: a discipline that is genuinely global and pluralist and one that recognizes the importance of attempting to understand, explain, and hopefully contribute to furthering the security of individuals as well as that of states.

First, move IR from the confines of political science and conceive of it as international studies broadly defined. If international studies were truly interdisciplinary, it would be more relevant for helping to better understand what I see as global problems, such as the environment, economic inequality, as well as the many issues that make people, as well as states, physically and economically insecure. We need to question the meaning of *security*, a term that is used frequently in international studies, and broaden its conventional meaning to include the security of individuals and the natural environment, as well as that of states.

Second, we need to break down the divide between scholars, policymakers, and activists.<sup>12</sup> We need to show more respect to scholars who do policy-relevant work that is too often seen as less prestigious than research at a higher theoretical level. Our research should be useful to policymakers and/or social activists, and more recognition should be given to those who identify themselves as scholar/activists. It is still the case that those who work at a theoretical level are accorded more professional rewards.

Third, we must accept the legitimacy of methodological pluralism. Certainly, there are many scholars who work outside positivist methodologies, but not all knowledge is created equal, and whose knowledge is validated and most highly rewarded is as much a matter of power politics as is power politics among states.

Fourth, we must broaden the definition of *the real world*. American IR is extremely parochial and suffers from a narrow definition of what the real world means, which

<sup>12</sup> This was the theme of the 2007 annual meeting of the International Studies Association. Some of the papers on this theme were published in Tickner and Tsyankov ed. 2008.



generally amounts to what is of importance to American security and economic interests. Studying the Global South or what are considered *soft* subjects such as human rights, global justice, gender, or race are considered less prestigious and less likely to lead to professional rewards. And as I have said, many scholars who work on these issues use postpositivist methodologies or postcolonial frameworks, frameworks that are not accorded equal respect in the profession.<sup>13</sup>

Fifth, explore different literatures. How often does American PhD training include writings of scholars from the Global South writing from a postcolonial perspective or those of scholars writing about race and gender?

While I realize that I have made some rather large generalizations about the way we teach and research international studies in the United States, I hope to provoke discussion and to uncover some of the hidden rules of our profession. Although most of them are not formalized, they contain a great deal of power, power that not only governs who is likely to be successful but power over what questions we ask about the international and how they get answered. In these troubled times, surely, we have a responsibility to try to understand global issues in all of their dimensions and with all of the tools that are available to us.

## Living on the Margins: Producing a Periphery of International Relations

COLIN WIGHT

*University of Sydney*

What are the current structures of power and rules in the international studies profession, and how do these structures influence who participates in and who is recognized as being a member of the international relations (IR) profession? This paper explores these questions through a brief examination of a group of people who exist on the margins of the discipline. They are neither entirely inside the discipline nor wholly outside of it. They move between the spaces of inclusion and exclusion in a manner determined by our need, or lack of, their labor. The discipline cannot function without their contribution, but nor are they accorded full membership. I am referring here to the army of casuals and adjunct professors whose labor is essential to the functioning of the profession but who are denied full membership, full recognition, and full access to the benefits that flow from being a fully accredited member of the field.

As Megan Kimber has put it, academics exist in disciplinary structures that have a “tenured core” and a “tenuous periphery” (Kimber 2003). This situation is not unique to international relations; it is endemic across the contemporary higher education (HE) sector. Dominant explanations of this problem tend to highlight the neoliberal university and the managerialism that flows from it. While this explanation captures something of the problem, it is not sufficient. An academic discipline is nothing but the practices of those within it. If there is a group of people barely existing on the margins of our community, it is incumbent on us to question whether our practices help keep them there. The “tenured core” enjoys unique benefits only insofar as the “tenuous periphery” can be kept in a marginal space where they can be called on at will but also discarded when no longer needed. We cannot let them escape this marginal outside because we need to keep them close so that they can

<sup>13</sup> Fortunately, this began to change about ten years ago. An early effort to effect this change was the important series *Worlding Beyond the West*. (See Tickner and Waever eds. 2009 and Tickner and Blaney eds. 2012). There is now more literature centered on the non-Western world. (See for examples Ling 2014; Acharya 2018.)

be called on when needed. Yet, nor can we afford them full membership because to do so, would deny us some of our most cherished benefits.

In this paper, I will briefly outline the scale of the problem, and then address some of the explanations. Space does not allow me to outline potential answers, but my aim is merely to open up a conversation where such solutions may emerge. As a discipline, we cannot change everything, and the structures that create the neoliberal university system we confront today are mostly beyond our control. What we can do something about is our practices that reproduce both the outside space and the manner in which the homeless occupiers of that space are exploited.

#### *Casualization: Setting the Scene*

More than half of academics in Australian universities are employed on a casual basis. In 2015, *Forbes* claimed that in the United States “nearly three-quarters of American professors are contingent faculty” (Pros 2015). This pattern is replicated in the UK, with over half of the teaching staff on nonpermanent or hourly paid contracts (Chakraborty and Weale 2016).

Sally Hunt, the general secretary of the University and College Union, has referred to the exploitative employment model of the UK higher education system as a “dirty little secret” (Hunt 2016). According to Marc Bosquet and Cary Nelson, many of those in possession of completed doctorates are the “waste product of graduate education” and, for many, “the receipt of the PhD signifies the end and not the beginning of a long teaching career” (Bosquet and Nelson 2008, 21–23).

It might be argued that these sector-wide figures do not translate in a direct way to political science, in general, and international relations, in particular. According to the American Political Science Association (APSA), tenured or tenure-track faculty comprised 68.1 percent of all faculty members, with tenured full professors the largest single faculty rank (29.0 percent of all faculty). Adjunct faculty made up the majority of new hires (38.9 percent of the total) (APSA 2018a). What the APSA data also show is that there is a developing divide between public and private institutions on this issue. “Public institutions hired significantly more adjunct faculty than their private counterparts, with adjunct faculty consisting of 43.1 percent of new hires at public ones, compared to just 29.1 percent at private departments” (APSA 2018a). Because of differences in funding models, this situation is reversed in the UK, with the highly research-intensive Russell Group universities employing a higher percentage of casuals, often close to 70 percent of all teaching staff (Chakraborty and Weale 2016). The reasons for these differences are partly due to the fact that private institutions in the United States have better staff-student ratios and are sufficiently well resourced to be able to employ more tenured staff. The Russell Group universities, on the other hand, like most public universities, subsidize their research with teaching income.

There can be little doubt that casualization is now an entrenched feature of the academic landscape. There was a small protest at ISA 2018, but the issues are only going to loom larger in our consideration of where power lies in the discipline. It is essential to distinguish between different kinds of casual staff within this larger picture. Higher education institutions always have, to a greater or lesser extent, used casual staff to assist in the teaching of high-volume undergraduate subjects. Often postgraduate students keen to gain teaching experience in the hope of pursuing an academic career have filled these positions. In addition, policy or industry experts are often deployed on a casual basis where their specific expertise is deemed advantageous to the teaching program.

Both of these groups bring valuable skills, knowledge, and enthusiasm to the curriculum. PhD students, in particular, are often some of the most committed and enthusiastic teachers, and we should ensure that they have teaching opportunities to build their resumes. Because of this, it is not appropriate to treat the figures

relating to casualization as representing a homogeneous group. Perhaps we need a more nuanced terminology here? I would not include PhD students undertaking teaching in a discussion of the negative aspects of casualization, nor would I want to include policy or industry experts who bring unique skills and experience to the student experience.

It is also important to differentiate between casual staff and part-time staff. Often people can be employed on a part-time basis because they do not wish to work full-time. So, it is possible to be tenured (or the equivalent) but only work for 50 percent of the week. Equally, it is possible to be employed on a full-time basis but on a casual contract. People on part-time contracts can still enjoy the full range of benefits and job security accorded to staff on full-time contracts. The point about casuals is that they are disposable. They have no permanency to their employment and can be dismissed or not reemployed with little or no justification. Their employment status is precarious. Precarity is the essence of casualization.

My primary concern is with those casuals who have completed their education, at whatever level, and who exist in a permanent situation of temporary contracts. This particular cohort of casuals “experience low rates of pay, job insecurity, negligible benefits and little integration into the departments and institutions in which they work” (Kimber 2003). The members of this temporary workforce have generally been awarded their PhD, have yet to acquire a tenure-track position, yet still aspire to an academic career. Casual teaching fulfills specific functions for them. First, it helps pay the bills. Second, it helps them gain more teaching experience, which, in theory at least, might help them gain their first permanent position. Third, it keeps them located, at least in some minimal way within the discipline. They are part of the teaching team, but they are not yet an academic; at least not in a recognizable sense of the term. Moreover, once located in the margins of permanent precarity, it is difficult to escape. The low wages ensure that more and more teaching is needed just to survive, thus ensuring that they are denied the possibility of developing a publications strategy that would land them a tenured position.

The folk image of the standard academic living a privileged existence in the ivory tower is far from their everyday experience. Casual academics are more often than not paid on an hourly basis and employed on a precarious semester to semester basis. Often, they are unaware of how many hours they will be working until the first week of the semester. Indeed, it is common for them to begin preparation work before they have a signed contract. In some cases, they will be promised work only to be informed with minimal notice that they are no longer required. Often, they will be expected to complete their duties while denied adequate office space. Rarely are they paid for nonclassroom tasks such as office hours and significant curriculum development. Holidays are merely periods without pay, and superannuation, when it is paid at all, is often a fraction of that enjoyed by full-time academics.

In addition to all this, they are in a strange position concerning membership of the discipline. Often, they have no say in the curriculum content and development that they teach. They rarely have a formal say in departmental decisions and more often than not have no representation on departmental decision-making committees. Given the relatively low levels of pay, they are often forced to take on high volumes of teaching, which means that their ability to complete research is severely limited. If they are lucky enough to complete some research that they wish to present, they are denied resources to attend critical annual conferences such as ISA.

Given the scale of casualization across the HE sector, it could be that the traditional model of a close relationship between research and teaching is now broken. When researchers can get their teaching loads reduced, more often than not they do so. Many of the top researchers in high ranking institutions often do little or no teaching, and teaching is now moving to the casualized workforce who often have little time to undertake research. Unless this situation is reversed, our notions of scholarship may need to be revised.

In Australia, there is an additional problem. University employee/employer relations in Australia are governed by an Enterprise Bargaining Agreement (EBA). In most cases, these agreements specify the number of hours a casual may work. A casual employed more than these hours can make a case to have their employment changed from a casual to a full-time contract; this is called conversion. To stop this from occurring, universities closely monitor individual casual loads so as only to offer below the threshold contracts. This means that casuals are forced into taking up employment across multiple institutions, never meeting the threshold in any one institution but meeting them when considered as a whole. This adds additional burdens on the casuals, as they are forced to learn and adapt to differing procedures across multiple institutions.

For many casuals, all of this was worthwhile as long as the promise of an academic career existed at some point in the future. But this rarely seems to be the case today, and while a casual position may be an entry-level step on a pathway to permanent employment for some, for the majority, casualization has become a permanent situation.

#### *Casualization: Why?*

Much of the debate on the “casualization crisis” points to the neoliberal university and the managerial practices that flow from it as being the principal source of the problem (Chakraborty and Weale 2016; Courtois and O’Keefe 2015; Enright, Alfrey, and Rynne 2017; Kimber 2003; Slaughter and Rhoades 2000). While there is something to that argument, there is a set of structural issues that have led to casualization becoming the norm across the sector. The neoliberal university certainly plays a role in managing the workforce, but is it a sufficient explanation of the source of increased casualization? My answer is no.

I do not want to downplay the role of the neoliberal university, but instead, I want to concentrate my attention on these structural factors that affect those of us in the discipline and which in large part make us complicit in the “casualization crisis.” To be clear, I am not attempting to apportion blame on individuals, but my previous research on the agency-structure problem (Wight 2006) suggests that we are implicated in the reproduction of the discipline through our everyday practices. If casualization has now become an accepted part of the way higher education is structured, it is because it is what we make of it.

I believe the following structural factors are needed to understand the causes of casualization of higher education today. First, increasing numbers of students are now attending university. According to one United Nations report, between 2000 and 2014, the total number of students in higher education institutions more than doubled, rising from 100 million to 207 million (United Nations Educational 2017). This is a good thing, but it puts pressure on universities to find resources to teach this increased demand. Moreover, it is important to understand the role of market volatility in the strategic decision-making of universities. Student numbers can fluctuate wildly, which makes universities reluctant to invest strategically in increased numbers of permanent staff. Risk analysis is undoubtedly pushing them toward casualization as a means of dealing with this increased student demand.

Second, state funding for higher education has not grown at the same rate as student demand. Indeed, in many instances, state funding has been cut and funding responsibility pushed onto students and their parents (McPhee 2014; Mitchell, Leachman, and Masterson 2016). This provides further economic incentives for universities to search for cheap (casual) solutions to the increased teaching demand.

Third, teaching is undervalued in relation to research. I have been chair of a large department in Australia for nearly four years now. Almost all conversations with staff about workloads involve discussions about gaining a reduced teaching load to

concentrate on research. All of the incentives push staff to reduce their teaching load to pursue research. Promotions primarily depend on research, and job search committees invariably privilege research over all else when assessing candidates. With such an incentive structure, I wholly endorse the desire of my staff to reduce their teaching loads to concentrate on research. But it does mean that a university may have the leading scholars in a field, but students will be taught by casual staff on precarious contracts, who do not have the time or security to develop their research careers. The problem here is not the staff; it is the perverse incentive structure and the devaluation of teaching by universities. Universities may promote the idea of a close relationship between teaching and research, but it is unfortunately not recognized sufficiently in the incentive structures.

Fourth, research funding for universities has also been cut. This means staff are encouraged, sometimes expected, and sometimes compelled to compete for external research grants. Successful applications often include sums allocated for teaching buyouts. Given the temporary nature of these buyouts, it makes sense for universities to cover these staff absences on a temporary basis as well. And the cheaper they can do it the better.

Fifth is the structure of university funding. Estimates vary, and there are going to be geographic differences, but data suggest that in some countries, university funding from teaching represents more than 70 percent of all funding (Norton 2015; UK 2016; Ross 2016). Once again, the Australian case puts the point in sharp relief. Australian academics have a very formal structure to their working day that is enshrined in the EBA, although I suspect most academics have a very similar, if non-formalized, set of expectations. In Australia, the academic working year is divided into what is known as the 40/40/20 model: 40 percent of an academic's time is allocated to research, 40 percent to teaching, and 20 percent to service (administration). Academics who take on additional administrative duties can get teaching relief, but since those duties are temporary, then the relief only needs to be temporary as well. Hence the incentive is to employ staff on a casual basis. However, given that over 70 percent of university funding is coming from teaching and also given that academics are only meant to spend 40 percent of their time teaching, it should be clear that there is a structural void in teaching that needs to be filled here—a void that equates to about a 30 percent gap—and how is that gap to be filled other than through a causal labor force?

Sixth, evidence from the American Political Science Association suggests that as a discipline we are training too many PhDs. Only about 30 percent of completed PhDs gain a tenure-track position (Association 2018b). There are more PhDs being trained than there are tenure-track positions available. Again, some of the explanation for this comes from the incentive structures. Staff gain prestige for playing a role in PhD supervision, and, in general, such supervision counts toward their teaching load. Supervising good PhD candidates is also one of the most pleasurable tasks of an academic career; hence there are strong incentives to take on PhDs, which both adds to the oversupply problem and reduces staff availability for undergraduate teaching.

### *Conclusion*

We need to be realistic. We are facing a number of structural issues that make the casualization of the academic workforce almost inevitable. Insofar as academic careers are primarily constructed on research outcomes, then it is unsurprising that staff will seek to maximize their research time. This means a reduction in the time they allocate to teach. Someone has to fill that gap, and it is equally predictable that university managers will do so in a way that does not put the long-term financial well-being of the institution at risk. It is all too easy to be critical of university leaders over the issue of casuals, but they are grappling with our need to safeguard

our research time. We are implicated in the casualization crisis, even as we bitterly complain about it. And, of course, university managers face their own version of neoliberalism with the requirement to keep at least one eye, often both, on the ever-proliferating university rankings and league tables—again, driven mainly by the admirable, although distorting mantra of “research first.”

But what can be done? I only have some tentative suggestions, but we need to begin to think through the long-term consequences of casualization before we find ourselves facing a situation beyond our control. The first and the most obvious thing is to question if we are training too many PhD students. We only need sufficient PhD students to fill the full-time tenured jobs the market can provide. Training PhDs knowing that only 30 percent of them can get full-time posts is unethical. Alternatively, we could stop thinking of the PhD as exclusively about training for an academic career. There have been moves in this area, but we could do more.

Perhaps, however, it is time to look more closely at the tenure system itself. Whatever the benefits of the tenure system, there is no doubt it impedes the flow of early career researchers into the university system. Perhaps, it is now time to revisit the tenure system so that staff who are no longer meeting research norms can free up space for early career researchers.

These options, however, are sticking plasters over a gaping wound. Since the problem is structural, individual initiatives cannot address it nor can blaming individual staff members for adapting their behavior to meet the demands of the system. Treating structural causes by individual initiatives is doomed to fail. Providing solutions to these issues is going to need a reevaluation of the relationship between teaching and research. It may also require limits on the amount of teaching staff can buy themselves out of, but more than anything, it needs academics to reflect on how their compliance with the system reproduces the norms of the system, in ways that make increasing casualization inevitable.

The idea of an academy consisting primarily of secure tenured (or equivalent) employees is probably a thing of the past. This is not, in most cases, due to the malign intent of university managers but the result of the structural pressures outlined above. But we need to approach this situation with our eyes open. Unfettered casualization will have severe negative consequences for the student experience, the capacity of universities to meet their long-term strategic aims, and of course, on what it means to be a member of an academic discipline. Eventually, this will lead to a retreat from the profession by younger scholars, as they feel exploited by the system and left on the margins by the members of the profession.

## Power Politics and International Relations Studies in the Global South

JESSICA DE ALBA-ULLOA

*Universidad Anáhuac México*

What is this thing called International Relations in the “English speaking countries” other than the “study” about how to “run the world from positions of strength”? In other places, at other times, it might be something else, but within those states which had the influence—as opposed to those that did not—it was little more than a rationalization for the exercise of power by the dominant nations over the weak. (E. H. Carr, cited in [Vitalis 2015](#), 1)

Carr’s quote, written in the 1930s, is appropriate today to explain what happens in the studies of international relations (IR). The structure of international politics reshapes, and it is this structure that limits and conditions the world, thus, explaining

and predicting its continuities (Waltz 1979). This continuity explains power politics: those who are strong have the capacity to exert their influence on others—on politics and economics, as well as in other issues, including the study of international relations. This is the case with most of the Global South.

The perception of IR in the Global South resembles this remark, in the sense that its people feel unheard and misrepresented by the elite of the IR “international” community. The term *Global South* does not come without baggage. It is used mainly—but not only—in transnational and postcolonial studies, and it refers to the Third World or the developing countries, many of which were colonies. It includes nations classified by the World Bank as low- and middle-income in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013). It has also been broadly defined as a “trans-sectional” network for people who study the Global South regions, the South as a whole, relevant South societies in the North, or relations between the North and South (ISA-Global South... 2018).

However it is defined, the Global South is a new denomination to an old division. Although there is a great coincidence in the location of the countries with respect to the equator, it is not a geographical matter. It has more to do with power and perception (del Prado 1998), with a homogeneous North versus a heterogeneous South with different levels of development and interests, which fit more into a pattern of domination of different kinds (Nye 2011) from the super powers and middle powers. Under these circumstances, how do they fit in the study of international relations, and why do they feel unrepresented?

#### *Powers Develop Knowledge . . . Others Consume It*

Modern IR emerged as an American specialty, or hegemonic discipline (cf. Barbé 1989). Although over the 1970s and 1980s it also developed quite richly in Europe, non-European, non-English, and non-developing world contributions were still left out (Smith 2000). From these two sources, the United States and Europe, came the academic boom that flourished in the developing countries and emerging powers. It began with the realist paradigm, followed by the transnational or pluralist paradigm, passing through the dependency theory more pertinent for Marxist-based analysis from the European tradition, arriving today at what is called the fourth debate between rationalists and reflectivists (cf. Keohane 1988; Jarvis 2000; Sjolander and Cox 1994; Smith, Booth, and Zaleski 1996).

Developing countries’ interest in IR as an academic discipline started somewhere in the 1950s, but it varied greatly in differences of context, taking into consideration decolonization processes, especially in Africa. In Asia and Latin America, not concerned at the time with independence, the development of the discipline was considered something important, as they began to fully insert themselves into the international community. Developing countries, modeling after the great powers, started their own argumentations on what to teach and read on IR, trying to make the knowledge fit their specific historical and contemporary circumstances, very different from those countries of the North, where knowledge started developing.

In Asia, the debates taking place appeared to be following the Western development of the discipline, without concern for theoretical developments or continuously questioning the utility of Western productions for Asian analysis (Acharya 2008). Latin America, being in the main sphere of American hegemony, also started its quest for a place in the discipline (Velázquez Flores et al. 2013; Morandé Lavín 1989). There were two main developments: first, those from the studies of the balance of power, foreign policy, and regional conflicts, all which helped explain traditional regional phenomena.

The second was related to economic and development perspectives, brought by what was called the dependency school. This school with its Marxist roots was very popular in a continent where the dominion of the great powers was felt, presenting

an imperialistic view of the world (Barbé 1989). It is known as the only theory originated in the Global South (cf. Cardoso and Faletto 1969; Dos Santos 2002; Prebisch 1981).

*Dependency Theory versus the American School in Latin America*

Since President James Monroe's "America for Americans" speech on December 2, 1823, Latin America was considered a natural area of the United States' influence. This country was the uncontested power in the region, influencing many aspects of life in the different countries, including the study of IR. To a large extent, international studies under the premises of the dependency theory aroused from the need for autonomy from the United States that surpassed the vision of the center-periphery relationship (van Klaveren 1985). There was an awareness of the need to introduce internal elements that, together with external ones, would allow an approach to a more complete explanation of the processes in the peripheral countries (Green 1979).

Regardless of the criticisms aimed at the dependency school authors, and, although they presented critical divergence on its interpretation (Dos Santos 2002), the theory was a subject of many publications, mostly from and in reference to the Global South (cf. Sta. Romana 1981; Emeh 2013; Frank 1991; Cardoso 1977), and continues to be a reference on the subject of underdevelopment.

When the dependence theory appeared, the countries of the Third World proposed modifications in commercial, monetary, financial, technological, foreign direct investment, and other areas. However, the proposals to establish the rules of a new international economic order were inconsequential (Green 1979). This also reflected on the development of the IR discipline in Latin American countries. Tomassini (1980) called attention to its poor development despite the impulse given by initiatives such as the Program of Joint Studies on International Relations of Latin America (RIAL) in 1977, which brought together the majority of study and research centers (Tomassini 2015).

By then, it was evident that the dichotomy continued. The Latin American Editor Group, responsible for the publication of IR texts, published mostly traditional theories, realism, and liberalism, thus contributing to IR being considered a discipline of the United States and Europe. The texts by authors from the United States became the references of the discipline in Latin America, as well as other regions of the Global South (Muñoz 1987). More than half of the courses on IR theory in the region are based on American authors (Tickner 2003; Tickner 2009; Murillo Zamora 2013; Salomón 2013–14).

The transformation of the international system from a rigid bipolar system with the United States as a great power coexisting with other middle powers has allowed greater margins of maneuver and autonomy for Latin American countries, which, in search of a new international role, favored the emergence of new approaches and conceptions in the context of social sciences (Morande Lavin 1989). Discussion about the dynamics of globalization, cosmopolitanism, and regionalization, as well as approaches like feminism, postcolonialism, postmodernism, and critical theory, among others—most used by European academia—added a new shade to the endless Latin American worry about its identity. According to Niño (2008), this demanded coherence with global economics and politics, more than a discursive strength tied to ideology.

*Scholarship Representation: Membership, Papers, and Publications*

According to Tickner and Waever (2009), Latin American scholars—as well as those of the rest of the Global South—find it difficult to fit into the global agenda. The first obstacle is that the issues of interest are mostly focused on their national



agendas. The second is the use of theories without any real theoretical innovation. An analysis on the theoretical frameworks used for papers presented for the International Studies Association (ISA) Theory Section in the conventions from 2014 to 2017 shows a consistent use of traditional as well as reflectivist paradigms, like realism, neorealism, governance, constructivist, sociology, critical theory, postcolonialism, poststructuralism, and biopolitics, on the part of scholars in the Global South (Arellanes Arellanes and De Alba Ulloa 2018).

To avoid constraining this analysis to ISA only, and as evidence that the Global South consumes most of what is produced in the North's centers of knowledge, without much innovation, we reviewed the relevant content within Scopus, the largest database of peer-reviewed literature overview of the world's research output in fields including IR. Three different searches were performed, with intent to cover the publications from the Global South, by searching article titles, keywords, and abstracts with the words "Global South," "international relations theory," and "postcolonialism" in journal publications from 2014 to 2018, restricted to the areas of social sciences and art and humanities, with the following results:

The first search, in article titles for "Global South," resulted in a total of 105 from all universities, mainly from the United States and the UK. From that sample, thirty-eight came from authors based in the Global South, a majority from South Africa, followed by Brazil. Some of them fit into the study of IR from the South's perspective, like Moore's "Internationalism in the Global South: The Evolution of a Concept" (2018), Chakrabarti's "Global South Rhetoric in India's Policy Projection" (2017), or Stuenkel's "Brazil and Responsibility to Protect: A Case of Agency and Norm Entrepreneurship in the Global South" (2016), some using critical theory, constructivism, or feminism; some addressing IR subjects in general but most reflecting a vision of the region; and many were not pertinent to IR, even using the appropriate filters (Elsevier 2018).

The second search, by article title, abstract, and keyword for "International Relations Theory," resulted in a total of 240 articles from all universities, mainly from the United States followed by the United Kingdom. From these, only thirty-seven were from authors in the Global South, Brazil having the most authorship (far from the United States at a rate of sixty-five to eight). It was not possible to determine a single theoretical framework of those articles. They ranged widely, including realism, peripheral realism, liberalism, Marxism, colonialism, energy, security, and post-Westphalian order. Some discussed renewed approaches, like Shih's "Transcending Hegemonic International Relations Theorization: Nothingness, Re-worlding, and Balance of Relationship" (2017); Aydınli and Biltekin's "Widening the World of IR: A Typology of Homegrown Theorizing" (2018); or Shahi and Ascione's "Rethinking the Absence of Post-Western International Relations Theory in India: 'Advaitic Monism' as an Alternative Epistemological Resource" (2015); others discussed how to teach IR in Brazil (Barasuol and da Silva 2016) or discussed approaches for China (Kim 2016; Schenoni and Escudé 2016).

The last search, by article title, abstract, and keyword for "Postcolonialism," was intended to find out if, by this term, which generally defines the Global South, it was possible to discover a new school of IR scholarship from the region. It resulted in 336 articles from all universities, headed by the United States with one hundred articles, followed by India and South Africa with ten articles. Narrowing the search to scholarship from the Global South resulted in only thirty-three documents, which reflected a wide variety of subjects under the lenses of the postcolonial framework.

These results give preliminary findings as to how limited the production of scholarly works from the Global South still is at this time. It is worthy noting that most of those who publish papers and books with voices from the South still come from the North's centers of knowledge (e.g., Beier 2005; Acharya 2017; Muppidi 2011; Mohanty, Russo, and Torres 1991; Funk 2016, among many others).

The third and last consideration comes from the fact that there is only limited participation of scholars from the Global South reflected in the presentation of the mentioned papers in ISA conventions. Participation is mostly from Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Iran, Mexico, Peru, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey (Arellanes Arellanes and De Alba Ulloa 2018). Although this analysis is limited to a section of the organization, it gives an idea of the use of theories and scholar representation. This also limits the development of local and regional networks of the Global South. Although participation in events abroad poses many constraints for scholars from the region, another important variable is their small representation via the membership in the main IR organization.

A review of the number of members of ISA by country shows that the North (thirty-eight countries total) accounts for the majority, starting with over one thousand memberships in the United States and followed by Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, with between one hundred and one thousand memberships. The other European countries follow with membership levels from fifty to one hundred, fifteen to fifty, five to fifteen, and a few countries with less than five members. Instead, the Global South's (forty-three countries total) highest quantity of memberships comes from Brazil with one hundred to one thousand members. The following states (China, India, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey) have membership levels ranging from fifty to one hundred. After that, membership levels in fewer countries go from fifteen to fifty members and from five to fifteen members. Finally, a great number of states (seventeen in total) have less than five members each (ISA membership 2018). This, by itself, makes participation uneven.

#### *Power Politics: Room for Change?*

Power, be it from Europe, China, Russia, or the United States, has nothing to do with race, subjugation, or colonialism but simply with power politics. As Layne argues, “[g]rand strategy is like real estate—location matters” (2009, 126). This means, as Waltz (1979) maintained, that the destinies of all states within a system are affected much more by the acts and interactions of the larger ones than by those of the small ones.

The Global South has, for many decades, made an effort to participate in IR debate and to produce unique knowledge. They will not change the balance of power, at least in the foreseeable future, but they can indeed produce limited but important work to share with the world. Even with different interests, they share common problems like terrorism, the economic agenda, migration, health, climate change, and the like.

The way to define the terms of what and where one writes is influenced by what one wants to research; it is a measure of a particular approximation, model, or theory (Holsti 1985). Is it possible, then, to innovate and create knowledge? The Global South is and has been at the receiving end of power politics; yet, given current dynamics in communications and shifting paradigms among and around the current powers, countries of the Global South are slowly emerging as consequential players. As such, we can opt for greater participation with innovation or simply continue to ride along and maybe expand on current IR schools and theories. With a degree of optimism, one should expect some innovation or pushback. The Global South might not exert power politics, but it is certainly a player.

#### References

- ACHARYA, AMITAV. 2008. “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia.” In *International Relations of Asia*, edited by D. Shambaugh and M. Yahuda, 57–82. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

- . 2017. "Theorising the International Relations of Asia: Necessity or Indulgence? Some Reflections." *The Pacific Review* 30 (6): 816–28.
- . 2018. *Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION. 2018a. "2016–2017 APSA Departmental Survey: Faculty Composition Report." Accessed June 20, 2018. [https://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/APSAFiles/DataReports/EmploymentData/Faculty Composition Report 2016–2017.pdf?ver=2018-03-26-160737-587&timestamp=1522094866226](https://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/APSAFiles/DataReports/EmploymentData/Faculty%20Composition%20Report%202016-2017.pdf?ver=2018-03-26-160737-587&timestamp=1522094866226).
- . 2018b. "2016–2017 APSA Graduate Placement Survey: Placement Report." American Political Science Association, Last Modified February 2018. [https://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/APSAFiles/DataReports/EmploymentData/GraduatePlacementReport2016–2017.pdf?ver=2018-02-02-103603-070](https://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/APSAFiles/DataReports/EmploymentData/GraduatePlacementReport2016-2017.pdf?ver=2018-02-02-103603-070).
- ARELLANES ARELLANES, JUAN, AND JESSICA L. DE ALBA ULLOA. 2018. "Enfoques teóricos de las relaciones internacionales. Racionalismo y reflectivismo en los congresos de ISA y el top 25 de revistas de RR.II. del JCR." Article accepted for publication (November 2018) for the *Anuario Mexicano de Relaciones Internacionales*. México City: FES Acatlán.
- ATEWOGLUGUN, DOYIN, TINU CORMISH, AND FATIMA TRESH. 2018. "Unconscious Bias Training: An Assessment of the Evidence for Effectiveness." Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Reports Series. <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/unconscious-bias-training-assessment-evidence-effectiveness>.
- AYDINLI, ERSEL, AND GONCA BILTEKIN. 2018. "Widening the World of IR: A Typology of Homegrown Theorizing." *All Azimuth* 7 (1): 45–68.
- BARASUOL, FERNANDA, AND ANDRÉ REIS DA SILVA. 2016. "International Relations Theory in Brazil: Trends and Challenges in Teaching and Research." *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 59 (2): e005.
- BARBÉ, ESTHER. 1989. "El estudio de las relaciones internacionales: ¿Crisis o consolidación de una disciplina?" *Revista de Estudios Políticos* 65: 173–196.
- BEIER, J. MARSHALL. 2005. *International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology, and the Limits of International Theory*. Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- BEHERA, NAVNITA C., AND KRISTINA HINDS. 2018. "ISA Task Force on the Global South." International Studies Association. [https://www.isanet.org/Portals/0/Documents/GlobalSouth/2018\\_GlobalSouthTaskForce.pdf](https://www.isanet.org/Portals/0/Documents/GlobalSouth/2018_GlobalSouthTaskForce.pdf)
- BOSQUET, MARC, AND CARY NELSON. 2008. *How the University Works: Higher Education and the Low-Wage Nation*. New York: New York University Press.
- BREUNING, MARIJKE, JOSEPH BREDEHOFT, AND EUGENE WALTON. 2005. "Promise and Performance: An Evaluation of Journals in International Relations." *International Studies Perspectives* 6 (4): 447–461.
- CAPRIOLI, MARY, AND MARK BOYER. 2001. "Gender, Violence and International Crisis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (4): 503–18.
- CARDOSO, FERNANDO H., AND ENZO FALETTO. 1969. *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina*. México City: Siglo XXI.
- CARDOSO, FERNANDO H. 1977. "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States." *Latin American Research Review* 12 (3): 7–24.
- CHAKRABORTY, ADITYA, AND SALLY WEALE. 2016. "Universities Accused of 'Importing Sports Direct Model' for Lecturers' Pay." *Guardian*, Higher Education. [https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/16/universities-accused-of-importing-sports-direct-model-for-lecturers-pay?CMP=share\\_btn\\_tw](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/16/universities-accused-of-importing-sports-direct-model-for-lecturers-pay?CMP=share_btn_tw).
- CHAKRABARTI, SHAMI. 2017. "Global South Rhetoric in India's Policy Projection." *Third World Quarterly* 38 (8): 1909–1920.
- COLGAN, JEFF. 2017. "Gender Bias in International Relations Graduate Education? New Evidence from Syllabi." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 50 (2): 456–460.
- COURTOIS, ALINE, AND THERESA O'KEEFE. 2015. "Precarity in the Ivory Cage: Neoliberalism and Casualisation of Work in the Irish Higher Education Sector." *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies* 13 (1): 43–66.
- DEL PRADO, JOSEFINA. 1998. "La división norte-sur en las relaciones internacionales." *Agenda Internacional* 5 (11): 23–34.
- DOS SANTOS, THEOTONIO. 2002. *Teoría de la dependencia. Balance y perspectivas*. México City: Plaza y Janés.
- ELSEVIER. 2018. Database search for "Global South," "International Relations Theory," and "Postcolonialism." Accessed November 1, 2018 <https://www.scopus.com/>.
- EMEH, IKECHUKWU. 2013. "Dependency Theory and Africa's Underdevelopment: A Paradigm Shift from Pseudo-intellectualism: The Nigerian Perspective." *International Journal of African and Asian Studies* 1: 116–128.

- EMERSON, MICHAEL O. 2018. "Who Hires Whom?" *Scatterplot*. Accessed August 5, 2018. <https://scatter.wordpress.com/2018/01/08/who-hires-whom/>.
- ENRIGHT, EIMEAR, LAURA ALFREY, AND STEVEN B. RYNNE. 2017. "Being and Becoming an Academic in the Neoliberal University: A Necessary Conversation." *Sport, Education and Society* 22 (1): 1–4.
- FRANK, ANDRÉ GUNDER. 1991. *El desarrollo del subdesarrollo. Un ensayo autobiográfico*. Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad.
- FUNK, KEVIN, compiler 2016. "The Global South Bibliography Project: A Resource for Teaching and Research of the Global South Caucus of International Studies (GSCIS)." List of references.
- GILPIN, ROBERT. 1987. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- GREEN, ROSARIO. 1979. *La importancia del estudio de las relaciones internacionales de los países latinoamericanos*. Trabajo presentado en la Comisión de Dependencia del Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO), Río de Janeiro.
- HANCOCK, KATHLEEN J., MATTHEW A. BAUM, AND MARIJKE BREUNING. 2013. "Women and Pre-tenure Scholarly Productivity in International Studies: An Investigation into the Leaky Career Pipeline." *International Studies Perspectives* 14 (4): 507–27.
- HESLI, VICKI L., JAE MOOK LEE, AND SARA McLAUGHLIN MITCHELL. 2012. "Predicting Rank Attainment in Political Science: What Else Besides Publications Affects Promotion?" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 45 (3): 475–492.
- HOLSTI, KALEVI J. 1985. *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd.
- HUDSON, VALERIE, MARY CAPRIOLI, BONNIE BALLIF-SPANVILL, ROSE McDERMOTT, AND CHAD E. EMMETT. 2008/09. "The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States." *International Security* 33 (3): 7–45.
- HUNT, SALLY. 2016. "Universities' Lack of Fight over Casualisation is an Embarrassment." *Times Higher Education*, December 2, 2016. Comment. <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/blog/universities-lack-fight-over-casualisation-embarrassment>.
- ISA-GLOBAL SOUTH. 2018. *Newsletter from the ISA Global South Caucus* 7, no. 1 (Spring ).
- ISA MEMBERSHIP BY COUNTRY. 2018. Accessed November 1, 2018. <https://www.isanet.org/ISA/About-ISA/Data/Membership>.
- JARVIS, DARRYL S. L. 2000. *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- JONES, HAZEL MORROW, AND JANET M. BOX-STEFFENSMEIER. 2014. "Implicit Bias and Why It Matters to the Field of Political Methodology." *The Political Methodologist*. Accessed August 5, 2018. <https://thepoliticalmethodologist.com/2014/03/31/implicit-bias-and-why-it-matters-to-the-field-of-political-methodology/>.
- KEOHANE, ROBERT. 1988. "International Institutions: Two Approaches." *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (4): 379–96.
- KEOHANE, ROBERT O., AND JOSEPH S. NYE. 1989. *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.
- KIM, HUN JOON. 2016. "Will IR Theory with Chinese Characteristics Be a Powerful Alternative?" *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9 (1): 59–79.
- KIMBER, MEGAN. 2003. "The Tenured 'Core' and the Tenuous 'Periphery': The Casualisation of Academic Work in Australian Universities." *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management* 25 (1): 41–50.
- LAYNE, CHRISTOPHER. 2009. "The Influence of Theory on Grand Strategy. The United States and a Rising China." In *Rethinking Realism in International Relations: between Tradition and Innovation*, edited by Annette Freyberg-Inan, Ewan Harrison and Patrick James, 103–35. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- LING, L. H. M. 2002. *Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West*. New York: Palgrave.
- 2014. *The Dao of World Politics: Towards a Post-Westphalian, Worldist International Relations*. New York: Routledge.
- MALINIAK, DANIEL, SUSAN PETERSON, RYAN POWERS, AND MICHAEL J. TIERNEY. 2014. *TRIP 2014 Faculty Survey*. Williamsburg, VA: Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations. Available at <https://trip.wm.edu/>.
- MALINIAK, DANIEL, RYAN POWERS, AND BARBARA F. WALTER. 2013. "The Gender Citation Gap in International Relations." *International Organization* 67 (4): 889–922.
- MARTELL, RICHARD F. 1991. "Sex Bias at Work: The Effect of Attentional and Memory Demands on Performance Ratings of Men and Women" *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 21 (23): 1939–60.

- MCPHEE, PETER. 2014. "The Commonwealth Used to Fund Universities: What Happened?" *The Conversation*. Accessed June 22, 2018. <https://theconversation.com/the-commonwealth-used-to-fund-universities-what-happened-27436>.
- MITCHELL, MICHAEL, MICHAEL LEACHMAN, AND KATHLEEN MASTERSON. 2016. "Funding Down, Tuition Up: State Cuts to Higher Education Threaten Quality and Affordability at Public Colleges." Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Last Modified August 15, 2016. <https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/funding-down-tuition-up>.
- MITCHELL, SARA McLAUGHLIN. 2017. "Dangerous Bargains with the Devil? Incorporating New Approaches in Peace Science for the Study of War." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34 (1): 98–116.
- MITLIN, DIANA, AND DAVID SATTERTHWAITE. 2013. *Urban Poverty in the Global South. Scale and Nature*. London, New York: Routledge.
- MITTELMAN, JAMES H. ed. 1997. *Globalization: Critical Reflections*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- MITTELMAN, JAMES H. 2018. *Implausible Dream: The World Class University and Repurposing Higher Education*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- MOHANTY, CHANDRA TALPADE, ANN RUSSO, AND LOURDES TORRES. 1991. *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- MOORE, CANDICE. 2018. "Internationalism in the Global South: The Evolution of a Concept." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 53 (6): 852–65.
- MORANDÉ LAVÍN, JOSÉ A. 1989. *Las relaciones internacionales en el mundo contemporáneo*. Serie de Publicaciones Especiales N° 71. Santiago: Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad de Chile.
- MORGENTHAU, HANS. 1973. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. New York, NY: Alfred Knopf.
- MUÑOZ, HERALDO. 1987. "Los estudios internacionales en América Latina. Problemas fundamentales." *Estudios Internacionales*, 51: 329–30.
- MUPPIDI, HIMADEEP. 2011. *The Postcolonial Signs of International Relations*. London: Hurst and Company.
- MURILLO ZAMORA, CARLOS. 2013. "Relaciones internacionales: Algunas consideraciones disciplinarias y teóricas." *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales de la UNAM* 116: 11–41.
- NIÑO, JAIRO. 2008. "Relaciones internacionales de América Latina. Lectura para la configuración de un sentido comunitario eficiente." *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad* 3 (2): 59–89.
- NORTON, ANDREW. 2015. "The Cash Nexus: How Teaching Funds Research in Australian Universities." Grattan Institute. Accessed 22 June 2018. <https://grattan.edu.au/report/the-cash-nexus-how-teaching-funds-research-in-australian-universities/>.
- NYE, J. S., JR. 2011. *The Future of Power*. New York: PublicAffairs.
- OWENS, EMILY, DAVID WEISBURD, KAREN L. AMENDOLA, AND GEOFFREY P. ALPERT. 2018. "Can You Build a Better Cop?" *Criminology and Public Policy* 17 (1): 41–87.
- PREBISCH, RAÚL. 1981. *Capitalismo periférico: Crisis y transformación*. México City: FCE.
- PROS, NOODLE. 2015. "More Than Half of College Faculty Are Adjuncts: Should You Care?" *Forbes*. Accessed June 20, 2018. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/noodleeducation/2015/05/28/more-than-half-of-college-faculty-are-adjuncts-should-you-care/-5d5b14551600>.
- ROSS, JOHN. 2016. "Australian Student Fees Fund University Research: OECD Report." *The Australian*, September 21, 2016, Higher Education. Accessed June 22, 2018. <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/australian-student-fees-fund-university-research-oecd-report/news-story/21f7be48cdda01f8c86b7dc1a85ceeb4?login=1>.
- SALOMÓN, MÓNICA. 2013–14. "Centro, periferia y la recepción de la teoría de las relaciones internacionales en Brasil." *Relaciones Internacionales* 24: 77–88.
- SANDLER, TODD. 2012. *The Political Economy of Terrorism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SARKEES, MEREDITH REID, AND NANCY E. MCGLEN. 1999. "Misdirected Backlash: The Evolving Nature of Backlash and the Status of Women in Political Science." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 32 (1): 100–8.
- SCHENONI, LUIS, AND CARLOS ESCUDÉ. 2016. "Peripheral Realism Revisited." 59 (1): 18.
- SCHMIDT, BRIAN. 1998. *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of Anarchy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- SHAHI, DEEPSHIKHA, AND GENNARO ASCIONE. 2015. "Rethinking the Absence of Post-Western International Relations Theory in India: 'Advaitic Monism' as an Alternative Epistemological Resource." *European Journal of International Relations* 22 (2): 313–34.
- SHIH, CHIH-YU. 2017. "Transcending Hegemonic International Relations Theorization: Nothingness, Re-worlding, and Balance of Relationship." *All Azimuth* 6 (2): 19–42.
- SJOLANDER, CLAIRE T., AND WAYNE S. COX. (eds.). 1994. *Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- SLAUGHTER, SHEILA, AND GARY RHOADES. 2000. "The Neo-liberal University." *New Labor Forum* (6): 73–79.
- SMITH, STEVE. 2000. "The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?" *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2 (3): 374–402.

- SMITH, S., K. BOOTH, AND M. ZALEWSKI, eds. 1996. *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- STA. ROMANA, ELPIDIO R. 1981. "El Estudio de la Dependencia en Asia: Corrientes y Problemas Principales." *Estudios de Asia y África* XVI (2): 310–41.
- STUENKEL, OLIVER. 2016. "Brazil and Responsibility to Protect: A Case of Agency and Norm Entrepreneurship in the Global South." *International Relations* 30 (3): 375–90.
- TICKNER, ARLENE. 2003. "Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World." *Millennium* 32 (2): 295–324.
- . 2009. "Latin America: Still Policy Dependent after all These Years?" In *International Relations Scholarship around the World*, edited by Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver, 32–52. London, New York: Routledge.
- TICKNER, ARLENE B., AND DAVID L. BLANEY, eds. 2012. *Thinking International Relations Differently*. New York: Routledge.
- TICKNER, ARLENE B., AND OLE WAEVER, eds. 2009. *International Relations Scholarship around the World*. New York: Routledge.
- TICKNER, J. ANN. 2005. "What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to IR's Methodological Questions." *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (1): 1–21.
- TICKNER, J. ANN. 2014. *A Feminist Voyage through International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- TICKNER, J. ANN, AND ANDREI TSYGANKOV, eds. 2008. "Risks and Opportunities of Crossing the Academy/Policy Divide." *International Studies Review* 10 (1):155–177.
- TOMASSINI, LUCIANO. 1980. "Factores ambientales, crisis de los centros y cambio en las relaciones internacionales de los países periféricos." *Revista CEPAL* 12: 149–178.
- . 2015[1981]. "Estudios internacionales en América Latina. Experiencias y desafíos." *Revista Relaciones Internacionales* 88 (2): 39–68.
- UHLMANN, ERIC LUIS, AND GEOFFREY L. COHEN. 2005. "Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination." *Psychological Science* 16 (6): 474–80.
- UK, UNIVERSITIES. 2016. "University Funding Explained." Universities UK. Accessed June 22, 2018. <https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2016/university-funding-explained.pdf>.
- UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION. 2017. *Six Ways to Ensure Higher Education Leaves No One Behind*. New York: United Nations.
- VAN KLAVEREN, ALBERTO. 1985. "El estudio de las relaciones internacionales en Chile. Logros, problemas, desafíos." In *El estudio de las relaciones internacionales en América Latina y el Caribe*, compiled by Rubén M. Perina, 100–25. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano.
- VELÁZQUEZ FLORES, RAFAEL, LUIS OCHOA BILBAO, JORGE SCHIAVON, AND MARTA TAWIL KURI. 2013. "Introducción." In *La disciplina de las relaciones internacionales en México: Enseñanza, enfoques y programas docentes*, edited by Rafael Velázquez Flores, Luis Ochoa Bilbao, Jorge Schiavon and Marta Tawil Kuri, 9–21. México City: BUAP/UABC/AMEI.
- VITALIS, ROBERT. 2015. *White World Order, Black Power Politics. The Birth of American International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- WALTZ, KENNETH. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
- WIGHT, COLIN. 2006. *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, Cambridge Studies in International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Copyright of International Studies Review is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.